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Abstract
Multi-issue negotiation may produce mutual beneficial
results to both negotiators while single-issue negotiation
can not. However, there are difficulties in automating a
multi-issue negotiation, since the search space grows
dramatically as the number of issues increases. Although
many concession strategy learning mechanisms have been
proposed to deal with the problem, recent research
uncovered that the fixed strategy of concession and the
fixed-pie bias are the two major interferences in the
automation of multi-issue negotiation. It is suggested that
the lack of communication between agents may have
impeded information sharing and joint-problem solving
possibilities.
In this paper, we show that the fixed-pie bias can
interfere with the negotiation outcome if there are
non-conflicting issues. We propose a new negotiation
model and an innovative algorithm that not only allows
information to be shared in a controlled way, but also
allows the information shared to be effectively used for
conducting a systematic search over the negotiation
problem space. The combined mechanism is capable of
using strategies learned from counter-offers and is
immune to the fixed-strategy limitation and the fixed-pie
bias. It contributes to the automation of multi-issue
negotiation in the context of open and dynamic
environments.

1. Introduction
Negotiation is a human behavior existed since there is
trade. People exchange products in order to give out what
they have for what they need. In the age of electronic
commerce, negotiation has been automated by software
agents or supported by negotiation support systems (NSS).
Research [10] [16] [11] [5] indicated that these
automation mechanisms were able to reduce significantly
the negotiation time and alleviate the negative effects of
human cognitive bias and limitation. The evolution went
from single-issue negotiation to multi-issue negotiation.
In a single-issue negotiation, the term negotiated is limited
to price. Although this kind of negotiation works for some
cases such as auction houses, most companies on the
Internet are generally against it since it brings out price
wars that not only causes chaos in markets but also
ignores the importance of other issues such as warranty
period and delivery time.
Multi-issue negotiation becomes an important
research area in the e-commerce domain, since it is more
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beneficial comparing to single-issue negotiation [14].
However, there are difficulties in automating a multi-issue
negotiation. Take a bilateral multi-issue negotiation,
where there is a buyer and a seller performing a
one-to-one negotiation, for example. Issues can be
negotiated sequentially or simultaneously. The
issue-by-issue approach suffers the drawback of being
unable (or costly) to go back to already negotiated issues.
Hence it is inappropriate for solving problems with
inter-dependent issues. In the simultaneous approach, on
the other hand, negotiators get lost easily in the complex
decision tree of concessions, and the search space grows
dramatically as the number of issues increases. Since we
assume self-interested agents, an agent will not disclose
his utility function, being afraid of the fact that the
opponent will take advantage of it to squeeze surplus out
of him. Given the situation, the only information disclosed
are the offers proposed and the information of acceptance
or rejection on the proposed offers. An algorithm is
required to search the negotiation problem space for
mutual beneficial agreements base on the limited
information. Adopting the simultaneous approach, there
are three types of algorithms:
1. Brute force: suppose that a buyer is bidding for
goods from a seller. He then queries the seller for
acceptance of each offer in mind, from the one with
highest utility to the one with lowest. The seller may
accept it or reject it. This process continues until the buyer
has run out of alternatives. To speed up the process, the
seller can counter-offer using the same method as the
buyer. Once an offer is accepted by one of two players, the
negotiation ends. This approach is similar to the
continuous double auction used in Kasbah [2], and may
work fine in the single-issue negotiation without time
constraints (i.e. deadline, bargaining cost, etc.). However,
it is hardly applicable to the multi-issue negotiation since
there are generally too many alternatives generated by
combining options of all the issues. Simply generating and
sorting them will require a lot of memory space, not to
mention querying them one by one, which can be very
time-consuming.
2. Use a concession strategy learned from past
negotiations: this approach works great if the market is
static, which means that the general utility function of
buyers/sellers does not change radically over time.
Although we do not know exactly the utility function of
the opponent, we learn from past negotiations to get the
best concession strategy that can both speed up the
negotiation and get better outcomes. However, if the

market is dynamic, this fixed strategy may not achieve
mutually beneficial outcomes each time, since different
opponents may have quite different utility functions over
the various issues. Research [13] [12] [17] belongs to this
type.
3. Use a concession strategy learned from counter
offers: although rarely seen in the research, it is possible to
learn a concession strategy from counter offers within a
negotiation session. The rationale behind it is to find out
which terms are important (weighted more in the utility) to
the opponent, but less important to us. Conceding on these
issues increases the possibility of being accepted by the
opponent, while preserving our interests. Research [4]
uses similarity criteria to make issue trade-offs; it is
believed that by making an offer similar to the one by the
opponent can approximate the preference structure of the
opponent.
In an open and dynamic environment, such as the
Internet, the third type algorithm becomes important. Goh
et al. [6] conducted an experimental study on
computer-supported bargaining in the context of
electronic commerce, and uncovered that the fixed
strategy of concession and the fixed pie bias are the two
major interferences in the automation of negotiation. It is
suggested that the lack of communication between agents
may have impeded information sharing and joint-problem
solving possibilities. The problem of fixed strategy has
been addressed later in [4] (though the existence of too
many assumptions has caused their research to be less
applicable to real cases). However, the joint-problem
solving possibilities are still constrained by the fixed-pie
bias and the information shared.
In this paper, we propose a new negotiation model and
an innovative algorithm that not only allows information
to be shared in a controlled way, but also allows the
information shared to be effectively used for conducting a
systematic search over the negotiation problem space. The
combined mechanism is capable of using strategies
learned from counter-offers and is immune to the
fixed-strategy limitation and fixed-pie bias. It contributes
to the automation of multi-issue negotiation in the context
of open and dynamic environments.
The sections are organized as follows: section 2 firstly
explains the rationale for information sharing. Section 3
describes the negotiation model used, and section 4 gives
details of the searching algorithm. Section 5 contains
experimental analysis and finally the conclusion and
future work is presented in section 6.

2. The Rationale for Information Sharing
In the context of Game Theory, the two-player
bargaining game is defined as a non-cooperative game
where two players attempt to divide a good, say a pie,
between them. However, the pie-dividing concept may
introduce the fixed-pie bias, which is a tendency for
negotiators to assume that their own interests directly
conflict with those of the other party [1] [18]. The problem
caused by this bias seldom occurs in a bargaining since

most of them are dealing with conflicting issues. Let us
consider a more general two-player multi-issue
negotiation problem, where the players not only negotiate
for the price, but also a date for delivering the product.
The utility gained from settling for a different date is
illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning, their preferences
seemed to be conflicting; nevertheless, they managed to
meet at day 7, which is the best solution for both of them.
The f curve occurs when a player wishes to get the
product immediately or on a later date if he can not get it
immediately. This example illustrates that sometimes the
pie-dividing concept may be misguiding, causing both
negotiators to neglect a mutually beneficial solution if
they do not communicate. Same problems can occur when
dealing with qualitative issues such as the choice of colors,
since the utility gained by each color may not always be
conflicting with the opponent’s preference.

Figure 1. Non-conflicting utility case
Research [4] was based on the pie-dividing concept;
however, they allow different levels of importance to be
attached to various negotiation decision variables. This
makes the negotiation a non-zero-sum game, where
players can find mutually beneficial agreements by
making trade-offs over issues instead of conceding at the
utility. That is to say, by increasing some decision
variables in value and decreasing some others may create
an offer that will benefit one or both of the players
simultaneously. However, considering the above delivery
time case, we find that a mutually beneficial offer can be
found by simply increasing the utility of one of the
decision variables without decreasing any other (instead
of conceding, one can raise the utility of the new offer). In
other words, better solutions can be found if we avoid the
fixed-pie bias. Nevertheless, by avoiding the fixed-pie
bias, we are again lost in the enormous possible paths of
solution searching. It is our belief that, by disclosing a
little more information, the player with less privacy
concerns can improve the negotiation outcome, and
therefore benefits himself. And it is also common that, in
the real life situation, a player with less privacy concerns
will simply release trade-off information, such as “you
can deliver the product to me immediately or a week
later.”

One may argue that, in the above delivery date case,
the opponent will propose the offer of day 7 eventually if
you did not propose it, yet in the multi-issue case, there
can be a lot of alternatives that it is too hard to enumerate
them all. Therefore how the information can be shared in a
systematic way such that the opponent can use it to
improve the solution searching process is the major
concern here. Besides, the information should be
disclosed in a controlled way so that it not only matches
our privacy preference but also complies with our
negotiation strategy. To tackle this problem, we propose a
new negotiation model and an innovative solution to the
searching problem in the following sections.

3. Tagged Multi-offer Negotiation Model
In this section we first provide an overview of our
negotiation model. Then we discuss the issues of time
constraints and information states.

3.1 The Negotiation Model
The settings of our negotiation model are based on a
non-cooperative, multi-stage, incomplete-information,
and two-player bargaining game. Since this is a
non-cooperative game, each player does his best to
maximize his own interest and will not share information
more with the other than necessary. We assume each
player knows neither the other’s preferences on issues,
nor the utility function; therefore it is a game with
incomplete information. Given such a situation, in order to
reach an agreement that is beneficial to both players, the
negotiation will continue for more than one stage.
Rubinstein proposed a multi-stage bargaining game
[15], in which each player of the game proposes an offer
in turn and the other may accept or reject it. The game will
continue until an offer is accepted. Our model differs from
[15] in that: Firstly, we allow multiple offers to be
proposed at one time. For example, a seller can propose
two offers at one time, saying “you can buy product A at
price B with delivery time C or buy product A at price D
with delivery time E”. The buyer may counter propose
with sayings like “I can only buy product A at price F with
delivery time G or buy product A at price H with delivery
time K”. This relaxation of multiple alternating offers
enables a player to disclose possible trade-off information
over which the opponent can consider. It can speed up the
searching process and avoid falling into local optima in
the solution landscape too early.
Besides the relaxation of multiple alternating offers,
we allow players to tag information of their preferences
over proposed offers. For example, a vector <<A, 3>, <B,
2>, <C, 1>> indicates that offer A is the most preferred,
offer B is the second most preferred, while offer C is the
least preferred. We allow the multiple alternating offers
and the tagging of preference information because we
believe the information may be “necessary” for both
players to reach an agreement that is beneficial to both of
them. However, how much information will be shared is a

decision made by the players. An elegant controlling
mechanism is embedded in our searching algorithm
(detailed in the next section), and it can be tuned
according to the privacy preference of the player.
Finally, the negotiation game will end in a known
period of time, no matter whether an agreement has been
reached. If an agreement has been reached before the
deadline, the players will continue to improve it until the
deadline. If no agreement has been reached before the
deadline, the negotiation fails. If more than one agreement
has been reached, the latest one is chosen. This design
permits better solutions to be found after the first
agreement has been reached.
We name this negotiation model a TAMON (TAgged
Multi-Offer Negotiation) model.

3.2 Time Constraints
Rubinstein’s model has a basic assumption that ‘time’
is valuable during the negotiation, and the fixed
bargaining cost or fixed discounting factor may affect the
strategy used in the bargaining. If each player has
complete information about the preferences of the other, a
weaker player (i.e. the one with higher fixed bargaining
cost) will always lose. However, assuming each player
does not know the preference structure of the other
(incomplete information), the weaker player may try to
cheat the other player by making the other player believe
that he is actually stronger.
To simplify the TAMON model (avoiding the
consideration of time-related strategies), we assume the
cost of time is negligible during a TAMON game. In other
words, by choosing a reasonable period of time to play the
negotiation game, it is possible for both players to agree
that there can be no time constraints during the period of
negotiation. By this simplification we make TAMON a
micro negotiation game. It does not mean that there are no
time constraints any more, but that the time constraints are
omitted during the TAMON game. The time constraints
still exist between the current TAMON game and the next
TAMON game. That is to say, to achieve an agreement,
both players can play a series of TAMON game that is
time constrained.
This simplification has two benefits:
1. The environment is stable during a TAMON game;
therefore players can focus on the searching and
improving of solutions without the need to deal with
changing environmental parameters.
2. Existed time-dependent bidding strategies such as
NDF [3] can be applied directly to a series of TAMON
game without conflicting with “micro” level strategies
used in the TAMON game.
This assumption also indicates that the goal of micro
level strategies will be to find a solution given the
constraints from “macro” level strategies. And macro
level strategies are applied on a series of TAMON game.

3.3 The Information State
Each player (let b denotes buyer and s denotes
seller) in a TAMON game is modeled as a 5-tuple I a with
a utility function U , a utility threshold U threshold , a degree
of information sharing D , a micro level strategy S and a
mutually agreed period of time T to play the game:
a
I a = U a , U threshold
, D a , S a , T , where a ∈ {b, s} .

(1)

We define the utility function to be a sum of weighted
contributions of N issues:
N

U = ∑ wi * ui , where ui = [ 0,1] and
i =1

N

∑w
i =1

i

= 1.

(2)

The utility contributed by each issue, however, is not
necessarily depending only on the value of this specific
issue, but also on the values of K other issues in the offer.
The occurances of this interdependency will make it
inappropriate to be negotiated in an issue-by-issue way.
The micro level strategy S is defined by the
algorithm and the algorithm parameters used for
generating and accepting offers (detailed in section 5). In
this paper, we will assume there is only one choice of
algorithm, the BGA (discussed in the next sub-section),
and D does not change during the series of TAMON
game. Therefore the macro level strategies contain only
functions determining the value of U threshold . The search
space bounded by U threshold in a TAMON game is
illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Search Space in a TAMON Game

4. The Bilateral Genetic Algorithm
To search in the space of a TAMON game, we need a
heuristic method that is computationally tractable; since
the overall search space is too large that an exhaustive
fashion of search is not possible. Considering a
single-issue negotiation for delivery time in Figure 3, if
both negotiators are using the same linear time-dependent
macro level function for decreasing the U threshold , their
agreement can be found at the intersection of utility x . In
this case, the offer generating process would be too simple
that the micro level TAMON game can be set to propose
only one offer in a turn and be played for only two turns
(in the first turn, the buyer proposes and the seller accepts

or rejects, in the second turn the seller proposes and the
buyer accepts or rejects). However, in a multi-issue search
space, it is almost impossible to generate all the offers
with utility x (while there are only two offers of utility
x evaluated using f or g in Figure 3, there can be a
huge number of offers of utility x in a multi-issue search
space, especially when given nonlinear utility functions).
Therefore, the searching algorithm can only propose some
of them, and there is a great chance that the search
algorithm will miss the right one. Suppose that a solution
is guessed out at utility x ' of time y '' later, and then a
mechanism will be required to back-search for the real
optimal solution of utility x . The Bilateral Genetic
Algorithm (BGA) is proposed to deal with this problem.

Figure 3. The Matching Point

4.1 Overview of BGA
BGA is an algorithm for searching solutions to the
TAMON problem. We apply the concepts of genetic
algorithm (GA [8]) to the domain of offers. That is, we use
a joint utility to express the fitness of an offer, and use an
evolutionary approach to find out the best offer if possible.
A very simple design of such an idea is to encode an offer
into a single chromosome and let the fitness of it be the
product (product is used instead of sum for fairness) of
two utility values from the buyer and the seller. For
example, let a chromosome {100, 5, 2, 3} (for readability,
we use n-ary gene encoding) represents an offer with price
of 100, quantity of 5 units, delivery time of 2 days and
warranty period of 3 years. If the joint utility of this
chromosome is high, the number of this individual will
grow exponentially in the population, as stated in GA.
And the population will eventually converge to the
answers we want.
However, since the agents are self-interested in our
scenario, each agent does not share information of his

utility with the other. Lacking the utility function from the
other agent, an agent will not be able to determine the joint
utility of a chromosome. Hence, both the buyer agent and
the seller agent are not able to perform the selection using
genetic operators on the population of offers. To
overcome this problem, we propose an innovative
algorithm BGA, which divides the population for
evolution into a buyer side population and a seller side
population, and uses two special genetic operators,
B-selection and B-recombination, to handle the selection
and recombination process in the presence of incomplete
fitness function. Both agents must perform the genetic
B-selection process and B-recombination process
separately. The B-selected population will be proposed to
the other player while the received population will be used
to B-recombine with our B-selected population, as
illustrated in Figure 4. The B-selection has a tunable
sampling rate, which can select offers for proposing
according to the D parameter. We will discuss the details
of each operation in the following sub-sections, and then
explain why it works.
Before we discuss the genetic operators used in BGA,
we firstly define the parameters used in BGA:
a
Population Size: Z population
∈ `.

Crossover Rate: R a = [ 0,1] .

Mutation Rate: M a = [ 0,1] .

a
Chromosomes: Cia , where i ∈ ` and 1 ≤ i ≤ Z population
.

Again: a ∈ {b, s}.

Figure 4. The BGA Evolution Process

4.2 B-selection, B-recombination and B-mutation
The selection process of a GA will produce a new
population with the distribution of chromosomes being
propotional to the fitness of each chromosome from the
old one. The one with higher fitness gets higher
probability to be selected in the resulted population.
B-selection does a little more: it will propose the
population of chromosomes to the other agent, and the
size of it will be affected by the degree of information
sharing (parameter D ). The actual size of population
proposed is:

Z offers =  Z population × D  .

Figure 6. Performing B-recombination
(3)

During the agent communications, duplicated offers
can be represented using a vector format <Offer,
Number>. The B-selected population then becomes offers
proposed to the other player in a tagged multi-offer format.
The higher value in D , the richer information in the
proposed offers. If Zoffers equals to 1, it becomes a normal
alternating offer protocol that proposes only one offer a
turn.
The B-recombination operator differs from the GA
recombination in that it recombines chromosomes from
the different-side B-selected populations. In other words,
one of the parent chromosomes comes from the buyer-side
B-selected population while the other from the seller-side
B-selected population. Since the population B-selected by
the other agent might have different size from ours, both
the received population and our B-selected population are
rescaled to half of our population size before they can be
put together into a joined population of size Z population (see

Figure 5). The joined population is then ready for
B-recombination. It should be noted that, each agent
might have a joined population of different size, since
their Z population values might be different.

Figure 5. The Joined Population

B-recombination of two chromosomes produces
chromosomes that represent offers applying different
concession strategies. For example, recombining a buyer
proposal {100, 4, 2, 4} with a seller proposal {120, 3, 2, 2}
may produce a proposal {100, 3, 2, 2} denoting that the
seller concedes at the price of value 100, and a proposal
{120, 4, 2, 4} denoting that the seller concedes at quantity,
delivery time and warranty period. Each agent performs
B-recombination at his own memory space; therefore the
crossover rates can be different at the two sides. After the
B-mutation process, the newly generated population then
replaces the old one (noted that the first generation is
randomly generated). The B-mutation is similar to the GA
mutation process except that it is performed separately at
both sides.
We use uniform crossover in B-recombination,
although it is considered to be maximally disruptive when
the epistatic interactions are the nearest neighbors [9]. We
believe it is required in our scenario, because it helps the
B-recombination generate more possibilities of
concessions assuming that the two negotiating agents may
have different information spaces. For example, if the
buyer can propose only one chromosome {A, B, C}, and
the seller can propose only one chromosome {D, E, F},
uniform crossover makes it possible to generate a
chromosome with {A, E, C} while one-point crossover
cannot.
In the final algorithm, the B-selection is actually
processed twice (Figure 7) by an agent in a turn; one for
proposing offers, and one for generating half of
population for next join. We need to separate these two
populations since the proposed one is bounded by the
utility threshold while the reserved one for next join is not.
The detail of the algorithm is not explained in this paper.
For interested readers, please check the web site:
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~d85725004/BGA.html.

Figure 7. The BGA algorithm

4.3 Preliminary Agreements
At the beginning of a BGA process, all chromosomes

U threshold
= 0.99*U threshold .

(i.e. offers) with utility higher than or equal to

are assigned a fitness value Fthreshold
The coefficient 0.99 is designed to make the fitness value
a little smaller than the U threshold . Once a preliminary
agreement (a proposed offer that is accepted) is reached,
the associated chromosome will be given fitness equals to
its real utility, which is higher than Fthreshold . The number
of this chromosome will then start to increase because of
its high utility (further explained in the next sub-section).
The discovery of a preliminary agreement also causes the
value of U threshold to climb up to the utility equaling to the
one of the preliminary agreement. This climbing behavior
ensures that the newly proposed offers will have a higher
utility than preliminary agreements. It is the
back-searching mechanism mentioned in the first
paragraph of this section. In the view of macro level
strategies, the value of U threshold often goes down
(decreasing) and does not go up, only when some
preliminary agreement has been reached, it then makes
sense to revert the U threshold to the new high utility
reached. This action is named a utility threshold reverting.

4.4 Implicit Parallelism in BGA
The main idea of BGA is to utilize the implicit
parallelism of GA to explore all possible concession
strategies and accumulate useful building blocks [7] at one

time. Implicit parallelism, named by Holland [8], is a
property that:
…Even though each generation we perform
computation proportional to the size of the population,
we get useful processing of something like n3 schemata
in parallel with no special bookkeeping or memory
other than the population itself…
In BGA, only preliminary agreements contain useful
building blocks that need to be accumulated in the later
search. That is why we restore fitness of chromosomes to
their actual utility value after they are found to be
preliminary agreements (before that, all fitness values are
lower than U threshold ).
By B-recombining chromosomes from two
populations of different sides, chromosomes representing
various offer-improving possibilities are generated. The
offer-improving behavior is a little bit like the similarity
approximation in [4], since B-recombination try to
generate an offer by recombining chromosomes from the
two different populations and the resulted chromosomes
will be similar to their parents. In fact, the BGA algorithm
does a better job then [4] for locating offers similar to the
opponent’s. Because research [4] try to find similar offers
by decreasing the utility distance, which is impossible if
certain kinds of information about the opponent’s utility
function is unavailalbe. Their simulations work simply
because there are too many assumptions (linear,
conflicting, same value range and equal discrimination
power over the reservation values) being placed on the
opponent’s utility function in their research. It makes the
assumption of “incomplete information” quite weak.

B-recombination does not have a fixed-pie bias, since
it does not assume a utility conceding is necessary when
trying to generate an alternative. In fact, the BGA never
decrease the utility of new offers, and try to increase the
utility whenever possible. Once an offer acceptable to
both sides is found, the utility threshold is increased, and
the useful genetic information in the offer will then be
accumulated in an evolutionary way.
To conclude, BGA can deal with the searching
problem of a TAMON game in a computationally tractable
way, and no specific assumptions are placed upon the
utility function of the opponent.

5. Experimental Analysis
A negotiation case with mixed (including linear and
nonlinear) utility function is prepared to test the capability
of BGA. The utility functions for 5 issues in buying a car
are listed in Table 1 (for simplicity, some of the functions
are not showed in detail; mechanisms used to ensure the
range of each utility value are omitted; for interested
readers, complete source codes can be found at
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~d85725004/BGA.html).
Two exceptions are added to override the default utility
functions. They provide extra interdependency among
these issues, and are the epistatic interactions as explained
in [9].

Table 2. Experiment parameters
Q Parameter Name
1 First Mover
2 Degree of Information Sharing
(DoIS for short)
3 Feedback of Preliminary Agreements
(FoPA)

Parameters
seller first
buyer first
1 (all)
0.1
0.0025
1 (all)
0.5
0.1

As expected, the first mover has disadvantage in the
TAMON game. The explanation is intuitive: since the first
mover shares information firstly, the opponent is then able
to increase his utility threshold firstly when preliminary
agreements are found in the first turn. Readers can
compare Figure 8 and Figure 9 to find out the difference
(noted that the X-axis in them represents the product of
DoIS and FoPA, and Y-axis the utility).

Table 1. Utility functions
Price
Time
Type
Color
Option
Exceptions

Buyer

Seller

(200 - ( (v*v)/200 ))
/200
Cos( (2*Pi*
(v mod 7))/7 )
{0.1, 0.2, 0.9, 0.5,
0.1}
{0.3, 0.4, 0.2, 0.7,
0.9}
(10-v)/10
If (Type = 1) and
(Color = 2) then both
issues get an utility
value of 0.9.

(v-20)/300
Sin( (2*Pi*
(v mod 30))/30 )
v/4

Figure 8. Buyer utility

{0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5, 0.5}
v/10
If (Time = 77) and
(Type = 1) then both
issues get an utility
value of 1.

Eighteen combinations of parameters (Table 2) are
used to run the simulations. They are designed to answer
the following questions:
1. Should I be the first mover? (should I propose offers
firstly?)
2. How do I propose? (how much information can be
disclosed?)
3. How do I response? (how much information should
be fed back to the opponent regarding his proposing?)
In question 2, the degree of information sharing
determines the sampling rate for proposing offers in mind,
and in question 3, the feedback rate of preliminary
agreements determines how much information regarding
one’s evaluation on the opponent’s offers will be fed back
to him.

Figure 9. Seller Utility
Judging from the results showed in the following
Figure 10 (FoPA = 1) and Figure 11 (DoIS = 1), we can
conclude that the effects of information sharing have
higher impact on the negotiation results then feedbacks.
The reason lies at that the number of preliminary
agreements is small comparing to the proposed offers.
Since both negotiators tend to decrease the utility
threshold slowly in the progress of negotiation, the
number of preliminary agreements can not be very large.
We also found that the degree of information sharing need

not to be very high for satisfactory negotiation results to
be gained.

Figure 12. BGA simulations
Figure 10. Effects of information sharing
The results in Table 3 show that BGA performs better
when information is shared via the TAMON protocol. In
the last case, where the degree of information sharing
equals to 0.0025, only one offer was proposed in a turn
(same as traditional negotiation model), and the ratio of
average negotiation results drops dramatically. However,
it is also found that by extending the TAMON game
period, the results can be improved (see Figure 13, X-axis
represents the degree of information sharing, and Y-axis
the resulting utility product).

Figure 11. Effects of feedback
In Figure 12 (X-axis represents the buyer utility and
Y-axis the seller utility, assuming FoPA = 1), the BGA
simulation results are compared to GA simulations with
same crossover rate (0.7) and mutation rate (0.02). Both
population sizes are set to 400. In GA simulations,
however, the algorithm has complete information of both
negotiators’ utility functions, and the product of buyer
utility and seller utility is used as the fitness value. 1000
generations were run for the GA simulations while a
period of 10 seconds was used in each micro level
TAMON game simulation. We assume same bargaining
power in the BGA simulations, therefore the utility
threshold decreases at same speed (0.1 per micro level
game) for both negotiators. Both GA and BGA
simulations were run 30 times to get the average
negotiation results in Table 3. The best result found by the
brute force algorithm (testing all combinations) is also
marked on Figure 12.
Table 3. Simulation results

Best
GA
BGA-1
BGA-0.5
BGA-0.0025

Buyer Utility *
Seller Utility (Avg)
0.532946667
0.520159512
0.508617115
0.491376085
0.397237238

Ratio
1
0.976006689
0.954348993
0.921998608
0.745360207

Figure 13. Effects of negotiation period

6. Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed the TAMON negotiation model and the
BGA algorithm in this paper. The TAMON model defines
a micro two-player negotiation game without time
constraints, and allows more information to be exchanged
in the negotiation game. The exclusion of time constraints
is important for simplifying a TAMON game, since most
search algorithms are not of real-time, and the search
space tends to be static during the searching. It also
permits a more complex search process to be conducted in
a TAMON game, with a constraint that the process should
be terminated after a period of time. By allowing more
information to be disclosed in a tagged multi-offer format,
the TAMON model incorporates the information sharing
behavior into the negotiation model. We can say that the
TAMON model provides a dimension for joint problem
solving possibilities, yet it is still in the context of a
non-cooperative game.

The BGA proposed in this paper utilizes the implicit
parallelism of GA to search the solutions in a TAMON
game. The elegance of the BGA is that it perfectly fits in
the TAMON game since the population to be proposed is
meaningfully transformed into the tagged multi-offer
format, and with the degree of information sharing being
taken into consideration. The algorithm is immune to the
fixed-strategy limitation and the fixed-pie bias, and it is
computationally tractable. It should be noted that it is not
required that both players use the same algorithm in the
negotiation. However, since the BGA can explore
multiple strategies simultaneously, we are investigating
that given the limitation of computational tractability,
whether the BGA-like algorithm will be the only rational
choice in a TAMON game.
We are developing a theory to measure the information
disclosed in the tagged multi-offer protocol and to
determine the precise effects caused by the information
sharing in a multi-issue negotiation. A theory for guiding
the choosing of BGA parameters, including the population
size, the crossover rate and the mutation rate will also be
addressed in the future work.
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